In the same way that having a body-schema allows humans and other animals to effectively control and monitor their physical bodies, having a mental self-model — a simplified description of one’s cognition and perception — allows agents to better control and monitor their mental states. I use a combination of behavioural testing, human neuroimaging and computational modelling to study how humans use this self-model to efficiently represent, learn, and flexibly adapt their behaviour to changing environments. Among the questions that keep me and my group busy are: what are the cognitive benefits of having an internal representation of one's own perception and cognition, and what happens when this representation is disturbed, biased, or not fully developed (for example, in young children)? In what way does a self-representation interact with memories of one's own actions and experiences, and with the feeling of being in control over one's actions? To what extent do people represent their own minds over and above a generic representation of minds? What is the scope of the human capacity to represent the hypothetical possibility of being someone else, and how does this capacity interact with moral decision-making and ethics?
Post-doctoral researcher. Birkbeck, University of London (2021-2023)
PhD in Neuroscience, UCL (2021)
MSc in Neuroscience and Psychology, Tel Aviv University (2016)
Adi Lautman Interdisciplinary Program for Outstanding Students, Tel Aviv University (2011-2015)
- Cognitive Science of the Self (metacognition; self-knowledge; self-representation; self-modelling; self-simulation; sense of agency; autobiographical memory)
- Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science
- Science-Ethics Interplay
- Mazor, M., Brown, S., Ciaunica, A., Demertzi, A., Fahrenfort, J., Faivre, N., ... & Lubianiker, N. (2023). The scientific study of consciousness cannot and should not be morally neutral. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 18(3), 535-543.
- Mazor, M., Siegel, M., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2023). Prospective search time estimates reveal the strengths and limits of internal models of visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
- Mazor, M., & Fleming, S. M. (2022). Efficient search termination without task experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
- Mazor, M., & Fleming, S. M. (2020). Distinguishing absence of awareness from awareness of absence. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II).
- Mazor, M., Mazor, N., & Mukamel, R. (2019). A novel tool for time‐locking study plans to results. European Journal of Neuroscience, 49(9), 1149-1156.
- List of all publications (external link)
- PhD co-supervisor (from 2022 to present). School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University.
- MSc co-supervisor (from 2021 to 2022). School of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London.
- MSc co-supervisor (from 2018 to 2020). Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL.
- Lecturer: “Introduction to Bayesian Statistics” (from 2016 to 2017). School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University.
- Lecturer: “Methods in MRI/fMRI” (2017). Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University.
- Teaching assistant: “Introduction to Computational Neuroscience” (2016). Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University.
- Research Innovation Grant (Birkbeck, University of London, 2022)
- Bogue Fellowship (UCL, 2019)
- Kenneth Lindsay Scholarship (Anglo-Israel Association, from 2017 to 2019)
- Graduate Research Scholarship (UCL, from 2017 to 2020)
- Overseas Research Scholarship (UCL, from 2017 to 2020)
- Award for Exceptional Academic Achievements (Tel Aviv University, 2013)
- Full Excellence Scholarship (Tel Aviv University, from 2011 to 2015)